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Abstract 
 
Although historical asset price ‘bubbles’ are often attributed to irrationality, the empirical 
analysis of such episodes has been limited. This paper examines a period known as the 
British Railway Mania, using a new dataset and a cross-sectional methodology which is 
unique to the study of historical asset price reversals. The results suggest that investors 
successfully incorporated forecasts of short-term dividend changes into their valuations, but 
were unable to predict longer-term changes.  When short-term growth is controlled for, it 
appears that the railways were priced consistently with the non-railways for almost the entire 
episode. These findings may imply that investors had imperfect foresight, but that they acted 
consistently. (JEL G01, G11, G12, N23). 
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Asset price reversals have been a feature of financial markets for many centuries, with 
periods such as the Tulip Mania, the South Sea Bubble, and the Wall Street Crash being 
prominent examples. The ‘Dot-Com Bubble’ and ‘Housing Bubble’ have led to a renewed 
interest in such episodes, with popular commentary often associating them with irrationality 
and mispricing. However, economists have tended to seek explanations in terms of rational 
behaviour. 
To analyse this issue it is helpful to differentiate between rationality which is defined in terms 
of expectations, and that which is defined in terms of procedure. One approach to assessing 
the rationality of a ‘bubble’ episode has been to focus on whether prices were similar to some 
assessment of a rational expectation, which in many cases resolves into a discussion of 
investors’ lack of foresight, and why they regarded this time as being different. 
However, it may also be insightful to consider investor behaviour in terms of procedural 
rationality. Given their subjective expectations, investors may be regarded as rational if they 
ensured that at any time each asset reflected only the sum of discounted cash flows. This 
would imply that each asset was priced consistently after controlling for fundamental factors 
such as dividends, growth and risk. By extension, assets in one industry should have been 
priced consistently with other industries, after accounting for such factors. 
Using an historical period, known as the British Railway Mania, this paper considers both 
approaches to rationality. During the Railway Mania, which the Economist (2008) has 
referred to as ‘arguably the greatest bubble in history’, the prices of railway shares changed 
substantially. A new dataset has been collected from primary sources for this analysis, which 
consists of weekly stock price and dividend data for every railway that was listed and 
operating during this period, and a sample of non-railway companies. The extent of the data 
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collection has produced a sample size which enables a greater depth of analysis than has been 
possible in the study of some other historical ‘bubble’ episodes. 
Investor foresight is considered by analysing the relationship between share prices and future 
dividend growth. The results suggest that companies with a relatively low dividend yield 
generally went on to experience higher dividend growth during the next few years, but there 
is little evidence of higher longer-term growth. This may imply that investors had imperfect 
foresight, and were only able to forecast short-term changes in dividends. 
The consistency of pricing is analysed in a series of 417 cross-sectional regressions, one for 
each week of the period between 1843 and 1850, relating the cross-sectional variation in 
dividend yields to future growth and risk. The inclusion of a dummy variable distinguishes 
the differences between railway stocks, which experienced a substantial price reversal, and 
non-railway assets, which did not. When future growth is not controlled for, the railways 
appear to have had significantly higher share prices than the non-railways for a total of 68 
weeks. However, when several periods of future growth are controlled for, this apparent 
overpricing is reduced to just 4 weeks. 
The results suggest that certain aspects of a ‘bubble’ can be regarded as rational, with 
investors showing a degree of foresight, and making an attempt to price assets consistently.  
However, it could also be argued that the lack of long-term foresight may be regarded as a 
failure of rationality, as Odlyzko (2010) does for the Railway Mania. Nevertheless, this does 
not necessarily imply that targeted intervention by regulators could improve upon the market 
solution, as this would require regulators to forecast the future better than other market 
participants. If they cannot, then they may find it difficult to predict substantial price declines 
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ex-ante, supporting the arguments of Bernanke (2002, 2010) and Mishkin (2008) regarding 
the identification of ‘bubbles’. 
The finding that investors responded to dividend changes is also consistent with the 
arguments of Bryer (1991), regarding the Railway Mania, that an increase in dividend 
payments, via accounting malpractice, could have been an effective way to attract investors 
who could then be ‘swindled’. However, this conclusion would also require evidence that 
dividends were raised fraudulently at this time, a suggestion which has been challenged by 
McCartney and Arnold (2003) and Arnold and McCartney (2003). 
This paper also contributes to the literature on asset price reversals by distinguishing between 
when rationality is defined in terms of expectations, and when it is defined in terms of 
procedure. A new methodology is employed for studying historical episodes, by focussing on 
the cross-sectional variation in asset prices, which enables an analysis of both. Although 
Frehen et al. (2009) have considered the cross-section of assets during the South Sea Bubble, 
their focus is on what factors may have influenced investor beliefs, rather than rationality. 
More generally, this paper contributes to other research on historical asset price ‘bubbles’ 
such as that on the Tulip Mania of 1636 (Garber, 2001), the South Sea Bubble of 1720 (Dale 
et al., 2005 and Shea, 2007) the German stock market boom of 1927 (Voth, 2003), the Wall 
Street boom of the late 1920s (Donaldson and Kamstra, 1996), and the Nasdaq bull market of 
the 1990s (Pástor and Veronesi, 2006). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) have also presented a 
long-term view of financial crises over a period of eight centuries. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1 examines the related literature on the definition 
of bubbles, Section 2 provides a brief background to the Railway Mania, Section 3 discusses 
the data used, whilst Section 4 estimates the movement in stock prices and dividends during 
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this period. Section 5 considers investor foresight, Section 6 examines the cross-sectional 
relationship between prices, growth and risk, Section 7 discusses robustness checks, with 
Section 8 being a brief conclusion.  
1 Bubbles and Rationality 
As noted by O’Hara (2008), there has been some ambiguity about the meaning of the term 
‘bubble’, with previous academic literature generally using two definitions. The popular 
usage of the term, per Kindleberger (2000, p.16), is an ‘upward price movement over an 
extended range that then implodes’, or what Bordo and Jeanne (2002) have described as an 
‘asset price reversal’. By using this first definition it is relatively easy to detect and label a 
bubble ex-post, simply by an observation of nominal prices. As will be demonstrated below, 
the Railway Mania can be classed as a bubble using this criteria, as there was a considerable 
stock price reversal during this period. 
However, the economic definition of a bubble is a deviation from fundamental value (Flood 
and Hodrick, 1990, p.88). As fundamental value is not necessarily observed directly, it is 
difficult to definitively detect irrational pricing. One approach to determining whether a 
certain period can be classified as an economic bubble has been to focus on the rationality of 
expectations, by considering whether the expectations of growth or uncertainty implied by 
asset prices were unrealistic (see Pástor and Veronesi, 2006, and Voth, 2003). Various 
econometric tests have also been proposed for the detection of bubbles, including variance 
bound tests (Shiller, 1981), the comparison of the ‘actual’ relationship and a theoretical 
‘constructed’ relationship between prices and dividends (West, 1987), co-integration tests 
which determine the orders of integration of prices and dividends (Diba and Grossman, 1988) 
and the relationship between the dividend yield and the level of dividends (Froot and 
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Obstfeld, 1991). This paper considers the accuracy of investor foresight during the Railway 
Mania by examining the relationship between prices and future growth.  
Another approach has been to consider whether investors acted rationally by pricing assets 
consistently. Dale et al. (2005) and Shea (2007) have debated whether several assets issued 
by the South Sea company were priced consistently with each other. In the context of the 
Railway Mania, it could be argued that if investors were rational and a bubble did not exist, 
the railways should have been priced consistently with the non-railways. Consistency of 
pricing would suggest that railway stock prices were determined by the same fundamental 
factors as non-railway stock prices, whilst inconsistency could suggest an irrational 
preference for the railways. This paper goes on to test the consistency of pricing during the 
Railway Mania by analysing whether railway stock prices were significantly different from 
other industries, after controlling for growth and risk. 
2 Background to Railway Mania 
The first modern passenger railway was the Liverpool and Manchester, which was promoted 
in 1824, authorised by Parliament in 1826, and opened in 1830. Over the subsequent decade 
about another sixty railways were constructed, with most of the lines projected during a 
minor promotion boom in 1836 and 1837. However, further promotion was subdued until the 
early 1840s. A period known as the Railway Mania then ensued, with share prices rising 
substantially from 1843 to 1845, and then falling steadily until 1850.  
The initial phase of the Mania was associated with strong economic growth, and a low rate of 
interest, with 3 per cent Consols, government debt perpetuities, reaching par for the first time 
for over a century (Economist, April 13, 1844, p.674). A widespread reduction in fares, 
combined with the economic conditions, produced a rapid increase in passenger numbers and 
revenues for the railways. Between 1843 and 1846, first class traffic on the ten largest 
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railways increased by 33 per cent, whilst second class and third class traffic increased by 68 
per cent and 187 per cent respectively. This resulted in an overall increase in passenger 
receipts of 41 per cent, whilst receipts from goods traffic also increased, by 42 per cent 
(Parliamentary Papers, 1847). These increases in traffic and receipts were achieved with a 
relatively small increase of 25 per cent in the mileage open of the largest lines. 
As the period progressed the promotion of new railway companies increased, reaching 
unprecedented levels in the autumn of 1845, just as railway share prices peaked. Some 
estimates suggested that over one thousand new railways were promoted at this time (The 
Times, November 17, 1845, p.4), although only a small number of these were ever 
constructed. These promotions exposed existing railways to the threat of competition, and 
encouraged amalgamations, often resulting in established lines purchasing newer lines which 
tended to earn lower returns on capital.  
The downturn in asset prices, beginning in the autumn of 1845, also coincided with the 
discovery of a potato blight, and defective harvest, which led to an economic downturn and 
the Irish Famine. A financial crisis then followed in 1847, which involved distress amongst 
many banks and merchants, and led to a further reduction in economic growth (Evans, 1849). 
Receipts from traffic continued to grow during the latter half of the decade, but the mileage 
open on the railway network had expanded considerably, and the resulting increase in 
operating expenses and issue of equity reduced the returns available to investors. 
The legitimacy of the dividend policy pursued by the railways during this period has been 
debated. During the downturn there was a suggestion in a pamphlet entitled the ‘Bubble of the 
Age’ (Smith, 1848) that the railway companies had artificially increased their dividends by 
raising new capital and then using the funds to increase payouts. In testimony before a 
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Parliamentary committee Samuel Laing, the chairman of the Brighton railway company and 
former member of a Railway Board which had been set up by Parliament, said that ‘dividends 
no doubt have been paid, which are altogether fictitious, and as long as you draw upon capital 
to pay them, the dividend may have no reference to the actual earning of the line,’ 
(Parliamentary Papers, 1849b, p.446, q.3058).  
Bryer (1991, p.456) has suggested that some companies may have stopped including 
depreciation in their accounts in order to raise dividends, in an attempt ‘to lure the naive into 
investing in railways’. However, McCartney and Arnold (2003, p.841) have found that, 
although the number of companies using depreciation fell during the Mania, this had little 
material impact. Depreciation did not amount to more than 0.3 per cent of returns on equity in 
any year between 1838 and 1855, so the dropping of depreciation cannot explain the changes 
in dividends during the Mania.  
The most reliable investigations of fraud were conducted by Committees of Inquiry which 
were set up by shareholders in 1849. There was considerable evidence of malpractice 
amongst companies which had been controlled by one chairman, George Hudson. In a report 
into the York, Newcastle and Berwick railway it was alleged that the accounts of the 
company had been falsified in a variety of ways since 1847, including the overstatement of 
traffic and the charging of expenses to capital which should have been charged to revenue 
(Railway Times, October 27, 1849, p.1086). An inquiry into the Eastern Counties found that 
after Hudson joined the company in October 1845 ‘expenses were squared to suit the 
dividend, and not the dividend to suit the expenses’ (Railway Times, April 28, 1849, p.439). 
The York and North Midland inquiry also found some evidence of misconduct (Railway 
Times, November 3, 1849, p.1109). However, Committees of Inquiries into other companies 
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found little evidence of any major problems, and Arnold and McCartney (2003) have argued 
that the perception of widespread malpractice is more myth than reality. 
Regardless of whether dividend changes were at least partially affected by fraud, commentary 
throughout the period suggested that dividends were regarded as an important consideration 
in the valuation of railway stocks. For example, the Economist (November 8, 1845, p.1109) 
noted that ‘with regard to the finished and dividend paying lines, they are of course calculated 
so as to yield a given rate of interest which must always have some reference to the rate 
which other securities yield, and so far the price of shares should fluctuate with other 
securities.’ Similarly, an investment pamphlet entitled the Short and Sure Guide to Railway 
Speculation advised that ‘as regards the purchase of shares in the established lines we have 
simply to compare the market price of the share with the dividend which it pays’ (Anon., 
1845, pp.5-6). It went on to note that ‘taking the value of money at four per cent, the shares in 
a railway which pays six per cent per annum are worth £150 each; or in one which pays ten 
per cent they are worth £250 each. If bought below these prices, the purchaser is receiving, 
pro tanto, a better rate than four per cent, and he will accept this better rate, in proportion to 
any doubt he may have with respect to the dividend being maintained.’ 
3 Data 
To improve our understanding of the Railway Mania, a unique and comprehensive dataset 
has been constructed, by inputting the original share price tables published in a weekly 
newspaper, the Railway Times, between 1843 and 1850. The share price dataset was 
supplemented with data on dividends, collected from the Course of the Exchange, an official 
stockbroker list for the London stock market. As this paper focuses entirely on those 
companies which were capable of paying dividends throughout this period, only the railways 
in operation at the beginning of the Mania, and the firms which resulted from mergers 
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involving these lines, are included. Campbell (2010) has already considered those projects 
which were initiated during the Mania. 
There were 64 railways listed in the Railway Times in the first week of 1843. However, the 
Course of the Exchange contained dividend data on only 41 of these railways. Due to a high 
number of mergers and acquisitions, the number of railway companies fell throughout the 
sample. If an established railway, in existence at the start of 1843, participated in a merger 
then the new company was also treated as an established railway and it was assumed that 
investors in the original company went on to receive the dividend of the merged firm. By the 
end of 1850 there were 27 established railways listed in the Railway Times, and dividend data 
was available from the Course of the Exchange for 24 of these railways.  
Data on the twenty largest non-railway companies by market capitalisation was also obtained 
from the Course of the Exchange. These twenty companies represented 45.2 per cent of total 
non-railway market capitalization at the beginning of 1843, suggesting that they give a good 
representation of the overall market.  There are six banks, five insurance companies, three 
canals, three docks, two gas, light, and coke companies, and one waterworks company 
included. Bank of England stock and East India stock have been excluded from the non-
railway sample as they were issued by companies with a strong relationship to the 
government.  
The number of shares in issue (N), the share price (P), the par value (Z), and the dividend (D) 
for each of the securities was recorded for each of the 417 weeks in the sample period. The 
logs of each variable are expressed in lower case letters. The par value of a share was the 
total amount of equity which shareholders had paid to the company for that security, and is 
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considered as a proxy for book value. To enable the analysis of dividend changes beyond the 
main sample period the dividend rates of companies until 1858 were included in the dataset. 
Fama and French (1992) suggest that risk dimensions can be proxied by beta, size and book-
to-market variables. The beta (B) of each firm has been estimated for each company for each 
year, by regressing the weekly returns of each asset minus the risk free rate, against the 
weekly returns of the market portfolio minus the risk free rate. The market portfolio has been 
approximated by the non-railways’ market index, which is likely to be more representative of 
a portfolio of all assets than a stock market index which is dominated by the railways. It is 
also consistent with the approach of Pástor and Veronesi (2009) when calculating the beta of 
the early US railroads. The risk-free rate has been approximated by the yield on 3 per cent 
Consols.  
The size (S) of the company has been measured as the total par value of the firm, calculated 
as the number of shares in issue multiplied by the par value of each share, and expressed in 
£millions. As another measure of pricing relative to fundamentals will be used in the 
following analysis, namely the dividend yield, the book-to-market variable is not considered. 
A railway dummy variable (R) has also been created, which equals one when the company 
was a railway, and zero otherwise. 
Only those companies which had been traded, and had an observable share price, could be 
included in the analysis, which reduced the sample size slightly, mainly in the early months 
of 1843. Observations where a company had a zero dividend yield are excluded, as such 
observations do not reveal any information about pricing. The average number of companies 
analysed each week in the cross-sectional regressions was 39.6, which involved a total of 
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16,501 observations over the sample. When periods of future dividend growth are included, 
these figures are reduced slightly due to data availability.  
4 Movement of Stock Prices and Dividends 
Weekly market indices for the established railway companies and the non-railway companies, 
for which share price and dividend data are available, have been constructed and are plotted 
in Figure 1. In each case the market return has been calculated on a weekly basis by 
weighting the capital gains of each company by its market capitalisation at the end of the 
preceding week. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 1>> 
The index representing the established railways rose from a base of 1,000 in January 1843 to 
a peak of 1,718 on August 8, 1845, but the non-railways index had risen to just 1,152 by this 
time. The established railway index then fell substantially, declining by 18.5 per cent by the 
end of November 1845, whilst the non-railways fell by 5.9 per cent during the same period. 
The established railway index then stabilised throughout 1846, before beginning a steady 
decline from January 1847 onwards, with the sample ending in 1850 with the established 
railway index at 727, and the non-railway index at 1,042.  
Whilst the prices of railway shares changed dramatically, railway dividends also rose and fell 
substantially. As can be seen from Figure 2, the dividends, as a percentage of par value, paid 
by established railways at the beginning of 1843 averaged 4.3 per cent. They then increased 
steadily, reaching a peak of 7.2 per cent in July 1847, before falling to just 2.9 per cent by the 
end of 1850. Higher dividends were evident in almost every one of the major railways during 
the boom, and dividend declines were almost universal during the downturn. The dividends 
paid by the non-railways were much less volatile, beginning 1843 at an average of 6.4 per 
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cent, and reaching 6.6 per cent by 1844, but they then fell slightly, ending 1850 at 6.1 per 
cent. The peak in railway share prices occurred almost two years before the peak in railway 
dividends, perhaps suggesting that investors were including estimates of future dividend 
changes into prices before the rates had actually changed. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 2>> 
The dividend/price ratios of the railway and non-railway industries are plotted in Figure 3. 
The railway industry dividend yield has been calculated as the total dividends paid by all the 
established railways as a fraction of the total market capitalisation of those railways, with the 
non-railways calculated in a similar manner. At the beginning of 1843 the dividend yields of 
the railway and non-railway industries were close, being 4.6 per cent and 4.8 per cent 
respectively. Although railway prices and dividends both rose and then fell during the sample 
period, prices seem to have moved in advance of dividends, resulting in a changing dividend 
yield. The railway industry dividend yield initially fell, reaching a minimum of 3.3 per cent in 
February 1844, but then rose substantially, reaching a peak of 7.3 per cent in October 1848.  
During the same period, the non-railway industry dividend yield remained between 4.2 and 
5.2 per cent. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 3>> 
Total return indices have also been constructed, which combine both capital gains and 
dividends, and are shown in Figure 4. The established railways total return index reaches a 
peak of 1,897 in August 1845, and ends the sample at a level of 1,056, implying that even 
after dividends have been included the total return to investors in established railways was 
close to zero between 1843 and 1850. In contrast, the non-railways reached a level of 1,513 
in 1850, which was the peak for the sample period. 
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<<INSERT FIGURE 4>> 
Descriptive statistics for each of the key variables included in the subsequent regression 
analysis have been reported in Table 1, by industry and by year. The mean dividend yield of 
the railways shows more change over time than that of the non-railways, with the railways 
having a relatively lower yield from the end of 1843 to 1846, before a dramatic rise gave 
them a relatively higher yield from 1847 to 1849.  
<<INSERT TABLE 1>> 
For the railways, dividends grew by an average of over 20 per cent per year, for three years 
during the boom, but then declined by an average of 30 per cent per year, for two years 
during the downturn. This was much greater than the average change amongst the non-
railways which never exceeded 4 per cent in any year. The standard deviation of dividend 
changes was also much greater amongst the railways than the non-railways in every year of 
the sample. 
The average beta of the railways rose and fell, but remained below one throughout the period, 
reflecting the weakness of the relationship between the movement in railway shares and the 
non-railways. Due to the possibility of errors-in-variables in the beta estimate, the subsequent 
regression analysis has been repeated without the inclusion of the beta variable and the key 
results remain the same, as discussed at the end of the paper. 
The size variable reveals that the average par value of railway companies was almost twice as 
large as that of the non-railways at the start of the period. Throughout the Mania the railways 
continued to expand, but the non-railways remained relatively stable, resulting in the railways 
ending the sample period an average of over six times as large.  
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5 Investor Foresight 
To analyse pricing during the Railway Mania a standard asset pricing relationship is 
considered, based on the traditional Gordon (1962) dividend growth model. Although the 
relationship between dividends and price is linear in this model, the relationship with the 
other variables, namely the discount and growth rates, is non-linear. To avoid this problem 
Campbell and Shiller (1988, p. 201) have proposed the dividend ratio model, or ‘dynamic 
Gordon model’, shown in Equation 1, which is linear in logs. This expresses the log of the 
dividend-price ratio (δ) as the expected discounted value of future discount (r) and dividend 
growth rates (∆d), with several terms which can be treated as constants (c, k and ρ). 
        
 
 
   
             
   
   
 
(1) 
The rest of this paper uses this relationship to examine both investor foresight, and the 
consistency of pricing, during the Railway Mania. One approach to considering the accuracy 
of investor foresight has been to illustrate the association between two of the variables from 
Equation 1, namely the dividend yield and future dividend growth, as per Campbell and 
Shiller (1998). Figure 5 plots the relationship between the log of the dividend yield and the 
dividend growth for railway companies between t and t + 1 year, for each company in the 
sample, with one observation per company at the end of each year of the sample. The 
negative correlation, of -0.654, implies that companies with a low dividend yield, meaning a 
relatively high price, went on to experience relatively higher growth during the subsequent 
year.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 5 >> 
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Table 2 reports fixed effects panel regressions which explain future dividend growth, for a 
range of horizons, using the log of the dividend yield, controlling for beta and size. There is 
one observation for each railway company, for the end of each year. The results suggest that a 
low dividend yield was a significant predictor of higher growth in dividends between t and 
t+1, and between t+1 and t+2. For longer term changes in dividends, the effect of the 
dividend yield is reversed, with the dividend yield having a positive and significant 
relationship with dividend changes between t+3 and t+4, and t+4 and t+5, which may suggest 
that investors were mistaken about longer term changes in dividends. However, there also 
appears to be a significant and negative relationship between the dividend yield and growth 
from t+6 to t+7. When the total growth in dividends between t and t+n is considered there is a 
highly significant negative relationship between the dividend yield and future dividend 
growth for each period analysed, which seems to be because the results are dominated by the 
initial growth in the first two years. 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 >> 
These results suggest that investors during the Railway Mania incorporated short-term future 
dividend fluctuations into their valuations, but they were unable to forecast longer-term 
changes. These results represent a possible explanation for why the prices of railway shares 
rose and fell during the Railway Mania. Investors during the boom responded to expectations 
of short-term increases in dividends, and did not forecast the longer-term declines, leading 
them to raise prices. When investors eventually did revise their expectations, and began to 
forecast lower dividends, prices began to fall.  
6 Consistency of Pricing 
The previous section considered rationality in terms of expectations, and suggested that 
investors during the Railway Mania had imperfect foresight with regards dividend changes. 
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This section considers rationality in terms of procedure, and examines whether investors 
priced different assets consistently. A cross-sectional regression for each week of the sample 
is used to estimate the relationship between the variables in Equation 1 at particular times 
during the Railway Mania. 
The log of the dividend yield (δ), is expressed as a function of future dividend growth (∆d), 
with differences in the discount rate approximated by the risk factors of beta (B), and size (S). 
The inclusion of a dummy variable for the railways (R) is also included to reveal if there was 
a significant difference between the railways and non-railways.  
For week = t 
                                           
(2) 
A cross-sectional regression is estimated for each week, with Table 3 reporting the 
coefficients and standard errors for regressions without the inclusion of any dividend growth 
variable, on selected weeks, as an example.  A regression for the start of the period, the last 
week of each year and for the peak in prices on August 8, 1845 is shown. This analysis was 
repeated for each of the 417 weeks of the sample period, with the last column reporting the 
number of weeks during which each variable was significant.  
<< INSERT TABLE 3 >> 
Table 3 reveals that when the variation in the log of dividend yields are analysed, without 
controlling for dividend growth, the railway dummy was significant on 93 weeks. This 
consists of 68 weeks when the railway dummy was significantly less than zero, which in this 
specification implies a relatively higher price, and 25 weeks when the railway dummy was 
significantly greater than zero, implying a relatively lower price. Panel A of Figure 6 shows 
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that the railway dummy was significantly negative for periods during 1844 and 1845, before 
rising during the latter half of the decade. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 6 >> 
To estimate the extent of mispricing whenever future dividend growth has been accounted 
for, the cross-sectional regressions have been extended by the inclusion of varying numbers 
of future changes in dividends. In Table 4 the number of weeks that each variable was 
significant when explaining the log of the dividend yield is reported. The next year of 
dividend growth was significant for between 300 and 345 weeks, depending on the number of 
future changes included, with the second year of dividend growth significant for between 229 
and 256 weeks. Longer-term growth measures are significant on a relatively small number of 
weeks. The number of weeks that the railway dummy was significant declines from 93 weeks 
to between 22 and 31 weeks, when one or two years of dividend growth are controlled for. 
<< INSERT TABLE 4 >> 
Table 5 analyses the number of weeks that the railway dummy was significant, by year, and 
considers whether this implied that the railways were overpriced or underpriced, given that 
the other variables had been controlled for. The railways were estimated to be overpriced 
during a particular week when the railway dummy was significantly less than zero, and 
underpriced when the railway dummy was significantly greater than zero. Results are shown 
for the number of weeks of overpricing and underpricing when varying numbers of years of 
dividend growth are accounted for. 
<< INSERT TABLE 5 >> 
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When no future dividend growth was accounted for, the railways appear to have been 
significantly overpriced for 68 weeks. However, when one, two or three years of dividend 
growth are included this apparent overpricing is substantially reduced, to between 4 and 6 
weeks depending on the specification, of which between 1 and 4 weeks occurred during the 
boom up to the end of 1845. Panel B of Figure 6 illustrates this result, and shows that when 
the next two years of dividend growth are considered, the coefficient of the railway dummy 
remains very close to zero throughout the boom in prices, and is only significantly different 
from zero for a brief period. 
If longer-term dividend growth is considered, the apparent overpricing of the railways 
reappears. For example, when variables accounting for growth up to seven years ahead are 
included, the railway dummy suggests that the railways had a significantly higher price than 
the non-railways for 88 weeks of the sample. These results imply that when short-term 
dividend changes are considered, the railways were priced consistently with the non-railways, 
but when longer-term changes are controlled for, the railways may have been overpriced for a 
substantial period. 
7 Robustness 
To ensure robustness, additional variations of the analysis have also been considered, 
although not tabulated separately. Due to the possibility of errors-in-variables in the 
estimation of beta, the analysis has been repeated without this variable. The coefficients of 
the dividend yield variable, from the panel regressions considering future growth as a 
dependent variable, all have the same sign and significance, with the exception of the 
regression analysing growth between t+6 and t+7, where the dividend yield becomes 
insignificant. From the cross-sectional regressions there still appears to have been 4 weeks of 
19 
 
overpricing when two years of future growth are controlled for, and a slight increase to 95 
weeks of overpricing when accounting for seven years of future growth. 
An analysis was also carried out excluding four railways controlled by George Hudson, 
which were associated with allegations of fraud in the aftermath of the Mania. The 
coefficients of the dividend yield variable, when used to predict future growth, have the same 
sign and significance as the original regressions, except for the periods involving t+1 to t+2, 
and t+6 to t+7, which lose their significance. The cross-sectional results suggest that the 
remaining railways were overpriced for 9 weeks when two years of growth are controlled for, 
and 90 weeks when seven years of growth are accounted for. This may indicate that Hudson’s 
companies had a slightly lower price than other railway companies during the sample period. 
The cross-sectional regressions have also been repeated with the dividend growth variables 
expressed as total growth from t to t+n. When total growth from t to t+2 is considered, the 
results suggest 3 weeks of overpricing for the railways. When the total growth from t to t+7 is 
considered as a single variable, the regressions imply that the railways were overpriced for 
158 weeks, representing almost the entire period between the start of 1844 and the end of 
1846. These results tend to support the previous findings that the railways were priced 
consistently with the non-railways given short-term dividend growth, but were overpriced 
given long-term dividend growth. 
8 Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive dataset of share prices and dividends for the established railways and 
non-railways which traded during the British Railway Mania, this paper has found that 
investors may have had some foresight, but it was short-term in nature. An analysis of the 
relationship between the current dividend yield and future dividend growth suggests that 
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investors incorporated short-term dividend changes into their valuations, but not longer-term 
changes. 
A cross-sectional analysis, which considered whether the railways had a relatively higher 
price than the non-railways, suggests that when no future growth is accounted for, the 
railways appear to have been overpriced for a considerable period during the boom. 
However, when short-term future changes in dividends are included the apparent overpricing 
is almost entirely eliminated. When longer-term changes are considered the overpricing is 
evident again. 
Whether or not these results imply rationality, or the presence of an economic bubble, 
depends upon definition. It could be argued that the use of available information, which may 
be predominantly short-term in nature, and the evidence of consistent pricing, support an 
explanation based on rationality and efficient markets. However, the inability to forecast the 
longer-term declines in dividends, which were related to weaker economic conditions, more 
competition, and decreasing economies of scale, may be interpreted by others as being 
evidence of irrationality, as suggested by Odlyzko (2010) for the Railway Mania. It could 
also be argued that the focus on short-term changes in dividends may make investors 
susceptible to being defrauded, as Bryer (1991) suggests occurred during this period. 
However, McCartney and Arnold (2003) and Arnold and McCartney (2003) have argued that 
there is little evidence that the dividend changes experienced at this time were due to 
accounting malpractice. 
The importance of fundamentals such as dividend growth, and the evidence of consistent 
pricing, highlights the difficulties of dealing with such periods in a modern context. However, 
the finding that investors had imperfect foresight may suggest that regulators could 
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successfully intervene if they had greater foresight than other market participants. Bernanke 
(2002) has argued that this is questionable, by suggesting that ‘to declare that a bubble exists, 
the Fed must not only be able to accurately estimate the unobservable fundamentals 
underlying equity valuations, it must have confidence that it can do so better than the 
financial professionals whose collective information is reflected in asset-market prices. I do 
not think this expectation is realistic, even for the Federal Reserve.’ It may therefore be 
impractical to expect regulators to be able to forecast and prevent financial instability ex-ante, 
when investors cannot. 
 
References 
Anon. 1845. A Short and Sure Guide to Railway Speculation, a Few Plain Rules How to 
Speculate with Safety and Profit in Railway Shares, Effingham Wilson. 
Arnold, A.J. and McCartney,S. 2003. ‘It May Be Earlier Than You Think’: Evidence, Myths 
and Informed Debate in Accounting History, Critical Perspectives on Accounting 
14:227–253 
Bernanke, B. S. 2002. Asset-Price 'Bubbles' and Monetary Policy. Speech delivered at the 
New York Chapter of the National Association for Business Economics, New York, 
October 15. 
Bernanke, B. S. 2010. Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble. Speech delivered at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia, January 3. 
Bryer, R. A. 1991. Accounting for the ‘Railway Mania’ of 1845–a Great Railway Swindle?, 
Accounting, Organisations and Society, 16( 5/6): 439-486.  
Bordo, M. D. and Jeanne, O. 2002. Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: Does 'Benign Neglect' 
Make Sense? International Finance, 5(2):139-64. 
Campbell, G. 2010. Leveraging the British Railway Mania: Derivatives for the Individual 
Investor, SSRN Working Paper. 
Campbell, J.Y. and Shiller, R.J. 1988. The Dividend-Price Ratio and Expectations of Future 
Dividends and Discount Factors. Review of Financial Studies 1(3):195-228.  
Campbell, J.Y. and Shiller, R.J. 1998. Valuation Ratios and the Long-Run Stock Market 
Outlook. Journal of Portfolio Management 24(2):11-26 
22 
 
Dale, R., Johnson, J.E.V. and Tang, L. 2005. Financial Markets can Go Mad: Evidence of 
Irrational Behaviour during the South Sea Bubble. Economic History Review 
58(2):233-271. 
Diba, B. and Grossman, H. 1988. Explosive Rational Bubbles in Stock Prices? American 
Economic Review 78:520-30. 
Donaldson, R.G. and Kamstra, M. 1996. A New Dividend Forecasting Procedure that Rejects 
Bubbles in Asset Prices: The Case of 1929's Stock Crash. Review of Financial 
Studies, 9:333-383. 
Economist. 2008. The Beauty of Bubbles, December 18. 
Evans, D.M. 1849. The Commercial Crisis, 1847-1848, David and Charles, Devon. 
Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. 1992. The Cross-section of Expected Stock Returns. Journal of 
Finance, 47(2): 427-465. 
Flood, R.P. and Hodrick, R.J. 1990. On Testing for Speculative Bubbles. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 4(2), 85-101. 
Frehen, R. G. P., Goetzmann, W. N. and Rouwenhorst, K. G. 2009. New Evidence on the 
First Financial Bubble. Yale ICF Working Paper, No. 09-04. 
Froot, K.A. and Obstfeld, M. 1991. Intrinsic Bubbles: The Case of Stock Prices. American 
Economic Review 81(5):1189-1214.  
Garber, P.M. 2001. Famous First Bubbles, the Fundamentals of Early Manias, MIT Press. 
Kindleberger, C.P. 2000. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, John 
Wiley and Sons.  
McCartney, S. and Arnold A. J. 2003. The Railway Mania of 1845-1847: Market Irrationality 
or Collusive Swindle Based on Accounting Distortions? Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal 16(5) :821-52. 
Odlyzko, A. 2010. Collective Hallucinations and Inefficient Markets: The British Railway 
Mania of the 1840s, University of Minnesota. 
O'Hara, M. 2008. Bubbles: Some Perspectives (and Loose Talk) from History. Review of 
Financial Studies 21(1):11-17.  
Parliamentary Papers. 1847. Summary of Returns, Showing the Number of Passengers 
Carried on 63 railways of the United Kingdom during the Year ending 30 June 1846, 
the Fares of each Class, and the Receipts from each Class of Passengers, and for 
Goods, LXIII:179. 
Parliamentary Papers. 1849a. First and second reports from the Select Committee of the 
House of Lords on audit of railway accounts, X:1 
Parliamentary Papers. 1849b. Select Committee of House of Lords on Audit of Railway 
Accounts Third Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index, X:469. 
23 
 
Parliamentary Papers. 1851. Railways. Return, showing the Number of Passengers Conveyed 
on All the Railways in England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, respectively, during 
the half-year ending the 30th June 1850, LI:229. 
Pástor, L. and Veronesi, P. 2006. Was there a Nasdaq Bubble in the Late 1990s? Journal of 
Financial Economics 81(1):61-100.  
Pástor, L. and Veronesi, P. 2009. Technological Revolutions and Stock Prices. American 
Economic Review 99(4):1451-1483.  
Reinhart, C.M. And Rogoff, K. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly. Princeton University Press. 
Shea, G. S. 2007. Financial Market Analysis Can Go Mad (in the Search for Irrational 
Behaviour During the South Sea Bubble), The Economic History Review, 60(4): 742-
765. 
Shiller, R.J. 1981. Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes 
in Dividends? American Economic Review 71:421-436. 
Voth, H.J. 2003. With a Bang, not a Whimper: Pricking Germany's ‘Stock Market Bubble’ in 
1927 and the Slide into Depression. Journal of Economic History 63(1):65-99. 
West, K. 1987. A Specification Test for Speculative Bubbles, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 102:553-80. 
24 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Companies by Industry on Selected Dates 
 
             
  
 Jan 6, 1843 Dec 29, 1843 Dec 27, 1844 Aug 8, 1845 Dec 26, 1845 Dec 25, 1846 Dec 31, 1847 Dec 29, 1848 Dec 28, 1849 Dec 27, 1850 
             
Number of Companies Established Railways N 18 22 21 21 20 19 18 22 15 18 
 Non-Railways N 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 19 20 20 
             
Dividend Yield (D/P) Established Railways Mean 5.8% 3.6% 3.6% 3.3% 3.8% 4.7% 5.9% 7.2% 6.3% 3.6% 
  St. Dev. 2.4% 1.3% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% 2.7% 3.0% 0.9% 
  Max 11.9% 7.0% 4.8% 4.9% 5.3% 8.0% 8.9% 16.8% 14.0% 5.2% 
  Min 2.7% 0.9% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8% 2.4% 3.1% 3.1% 2.9% 1.1% 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 4.81% 4.69% 4.43% 4.30% 4.84% 5.17% 5.20% 5.64% 5.17% 4.95% 
  St. Dev. 1.02% 1.03% 1.18% 1.08% 1.66% 2.27% 1.50% 2.03% 1.88% 1.65% 
  Max 7.11% 7.14% 7.27% 6.86% 8.89% 11.43% 10.00% 10.97% 10.81% 10.81% 
  Min 2.08% 2.98% 2.70% 2.66% 2.78% 2.53% 2.76% 2.91% 2.96% 2.84% 
             
Dividend Growth during 
Subsequent Year (∆dt+1) 
Established Railways Mean -11.64% 11.13% 20.88% 23.31% 23.99% -8.40% -11.18% -36.12% -36.41% 19.97% 
 St. Dev. 35.50% 35.97% 55.58% 46.80% 49.26% 28.35% 23.44% 50.04% 53.55% 26.66% 
  Max 40.55% 99.63% 185.63% 179.18% 179.18% 43.08% 32.85% 28.77% 14.31% 69.31% 
  Min -87.55% -47.00% -117.87% -10.59% -18.23% -88.38% -55.96% -138.63% -160.94% -10.54% 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 3.79% 0.59% -2.35% 2.08% -1.07% -0.81% -1.17% 2.81% -0.79% -3.46% 
  St. Dev. 15.49% 2.63% 7.43% 5.61% 9.75% 8.98% 5.12% 9.06% 9.76% 14.34% 
  Max 69.31% 11.78% 0.00% 22.31% 10.54% 18.23% 0.00% 25.33% 28.77% 22.31% 
  Min 0.00% 0.00% -28.77% 0.00% -40.55% -33.65% -22.31% -12.52% -22.31% -43.08% 
             
Beta (B) Established Railways Mean 0.19 0.28 0.51 1.07 1.00 0.54 0.19 -0.21 0.32 0.00 
  St. Dev. 0.73 0.68 1.83 1.43 1.42 1.00 0.40 2.25 0.54 1.18 
  Max 1.41 1.41 5.75 5.46 5.46 2.25 1.19 7.07 1.39 0.89 
  Min -1.27 -0.88 -2.94 -1.43 -1.43 -0.83 -0.37 -7.03 -0.40 -4.11 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 1.22 1.22 1.06 1.01 1.01 1.28 1.21 0.99 1.10 1.11 
  St. Dev. 2.92 2.92 1.23 1.22 1.22 2.86 2.67 2.29 2.13 4.11 
  Max 12.77 12.77 4.73 4.03 4.03 12.57 8.25 10.17 9.59 18.32 
  Min -0.14 -0.14 -0.32 -0.65 -0.65 -0.35 -0.89 -0.50 -0.02 -0.90 
             
Size in £millions  (S) Established Railways Mean 1.48 1.38 1.55 1.92 2.10 2.48 4.14 4.61 5.03 5.90 
  St. Dev. 1.04 1.05 1.21 1.46 1.51 2.03 3.85 4.48 5.38 5.47 
  Max 3.96 4.32 4.32 5.26 5.80 6.65 14.34 15.66 15.72 18.40 
  Min 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.26 0.11 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.53 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.90 
  St. Dev. 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.78 0.78 
  Max 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.64 3.64 
  Min 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
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Table 2: Yearly Entity Fixed Effects Panel Regressions using Future Growth 
in Dividends as Dependent Variable 
 
        
 
Dividend Growth between years  
 
t and t+1 t+1 and t+2 t+2 and t+3 t+3 and t+4 t+4 and t+5 t+5 and t+6 t+6 and t+7 
        
δt -0.863*** -0.174* -0.035 0.363** 0.173** 0.057 -0.122* 
 (0.098) (0.088) (0.096) (0.161) (0.068) (0.075) (0.071) 
Bt -0.000 -0.026 -0.086*** 0.007 0.041 -0.023 0.037 
 (0.025) (0.044) (0.026) (0.027) (0.037) (0.037) (0.026) 
St -0.018* -0.018 0.013 0.022* 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.028** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) 
Constant -2.649*** -0.489 -0.142 0.990* 0.347 0.047 -0.525** 
 (0.314) (0.304) (0.304) (0.521) (0.217) (0.237) (0.252) 
        
Observations 187 162 155 146 143 137 133 
Companies 47 40 39 35 35 33 31 
Overall-R
2
 0.549 0.037 0.049 0.166 0.126 0.042 0.060 
        
 Dividend Growth between years  
 t and t+1 t and t+2 t and t+3 t and t+4 t and t+5 t and t+6 t and t+7 
        
δt -0.863*** -1.174*** -1.325*** -0.929*** -0.731*** -0.670*** -0.829*** 
 (0.098) (0.086) (0.152) (0.240) (0.199) (0.128) (0.090) 
Bt -0.000 -0.038 -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.103 -0.116*** -0.074** 
 (0.025) (0.037) (0.029) (0.035) (0.065) (0.034) (0.033) 
St -0.018* -0.023* 0.001 0.020 0.041** 0.058** 0.084*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.023) 
Constant -2.649*** -3.592*** -4.144*** -3.055*** -2.617*** -2.539*** -3.202*** 
 (0.314) (0.277) (0.475) (0.752) (0.639) (0.457) (0.323) 
        
Observations 187 174 163 154 151 142 140 
Companies 47 46 41 38 37 33 33 
Overall-R
2
 0.549 0.580 0.509 0.236 0.203 0.285 0.504 
        
Notes: δ=Log of Dividend Yield, B=Beta, S=Size. One observation per company at the end of each year of the sample. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Significance given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 3: Cross-sectional Regressions on Selected Weeks using Log Dividend Yield as Dependent Variable 
 
 
              
 Jan 6, 1843 Dec 29, 1843 Dec 27, 1844 Aug 8, 1845 Dec 26, 1845 Dec 25, 1846 Dec 31, 1847 Dec 29, 1848 Dec 28, 1849 Dec 27, 1850 
 Total 
No. of 
Weeks 
Sig. 
             
R 0.184* -0.382*** -0.255* -0.376** -0.317** -0.134 0.033 0.221 0.199 -0.353**  93 
 (0.108) (0.134) (0.143) (0.155) (0.146) (0.120) (0.113) (0.140) (0.180) (0.132)   
B 0.001 -0.015 0.039 0.023 0.121** 0.014 0.002 -0.005 -0.026 -0.020  69 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.038) (0.041) (0.046) (0.019) (0.014) (0.007) (0.017) (0.012)   
S -0.073 0.046 0.047 0.060 0.036 0.047* 0.028* 0.003 -0.019 0.004  3 
 (0.057) (0.061) (0.071) (0.050) (0.038) (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.009)   
Constant -2.999*** -3.102*** -3.229*** -3.249*** -3.229*** -3.093*** -3.019*** -2.924*** -2.965*** -3.029***  417 
 (0.096) (0.078) (0.122) (0.073) (0.079) (0.085) (0.078) (0.081) (0.086) (0.065)   
             
Obs. 38 42 41 41 40 39 37 41 35 38  16,501 
R
2
 0.084 0.197 0.125 0.189 0.274 0.063 0.129 0.118 0.077 0.237  0.057 
             
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is reported for selected weeks of the sample, with no dividend growth variable included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance 
given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The total number of weeks that a variable is significant is shown in final column. δ=Log of Dividend Yield, d=Log of Dividend, B=Beta, 
S=Size, R=Railway Dummy. 
 
For week = t 
                                           
(2) 
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Table 4: Number of Weeks during which Variables are Significant 
from Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
         
R 93 22 31 62 92 105 108 104 
B 69 67 83 68 78 72 59 53 
S 3 27 30 33 29 20 10 21 
(∆d) t+1  300 332 345 319 323 315 342 
(∆d) t+2   246 245 239 256 245 229 
(∆d) t+3    188 145 158 175 164 
(∆d) t+4     70 91 144 138 
(∆d) t+5      103 127 110 
(∆d) t+6       80 81 
(∆d) t+7        45 
Cons. 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 
         
Ave. Obs. 39.6 36.4 34.6 33.5 32.3 31.6 30.8 30.3 
Obs. 16,501 15,198 14,441 13,985 13,486 13,159 12,832 12,638 
Ave. Adj R
2
 0.057 0.326 0.405 0.479 0.509 0.525 0.516 0.520 
         
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 was calculated for each week of the sample, with varying numbers of years of 
dividend growth included. The total number of weeks that a variable is significant is shown for each specification. δ=Log of 
Dividend Yield, d=Log of Dividend, B=Beta, S=Size, R=Railway Dummy. 
For week = t 
                                           
(2) 
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Table 5: Estimates of the Number of Weeks of Over and Under Pricing of Railway Shares between 1843 and 1850 using 
Railway Dummy from Dividend Yield regressions 
 
                  
 
No. of Years 
of Future 
Changes in 
Dividends 
Included 
Overpriced or 
Underpriced 
 
1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 
 
Total  
Relative to 
n=0 
 
Total  
(% of 
sample) 
Relative to 
n=0 (%  
of sample) 
                  
 
n = 0 Overpriced 
 
8 19 27 8 0 0 0 6 
 
68 - 
 
16.3% - 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 
 
25 - 
 
6.0% - 
                  
 
n = 1 Overpriced 
 
0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 
4 -64 
 
1.0% -15.3% 
  
Underpriced 
 
5 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 
 
18 -7 
 
4.3% -1.7% 
                  
 
n = 2 Overpriced 
 
0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 
 
4 -64 
 
1.0% -15.3% 
  
Underpriced 
 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
 
27 2 
 
6.5% 0.5% 
                  
 
n = 3 Overpriced 
 
0 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 
 
6 -62 
 
1.4% -14.9% 
  
Underpriced 
 
32 7 0 0 0 0 0 17 
 
56 31 
 
13.4% 7.4% 
                  
 
n = 4 Overpriced 
 
0 0 2 16 10 0 0 0 
 
28 -40 
 
6.7% -9.6% 
  
Underpriced 
 
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 
 
64 39 
 
15.3% 9.4% 
                  
 
n = 5 Overpriced 
 
0 4 11 28 2 0 0 0 
 
45 -23 
 
10.8% -5.5% 
  
Underpriced 
 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 
 
60 35 
 
14.4% 8.4% 
                  
 
n = 6 Overpriced 
 
0 18 25 27 5 0 0 1 
 
76 8 
 
18.2% 1.9% 
  
Underpriced 
 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 
 
32 7 
 
7.7% 1.7% 
                  
 
n = 7 Overpriced 
 
1 20 18 32 15 1 0 1 
 
88 20 
 
21.1% 4.8% 
  
Underpriced 
 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
 
16 -9 
 
3.8% -2.2% 
                  Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is calculated for each week of the sample, with varying numbers of years of dividend growth included. The railways are estimated to be overpriced during a 
particular week when the railway dummy    ) is significantly less than zero, as this implies that railways had a significantly lower dividend yield than non-railways during that week, when future dividend 
growth is controlled for. Conversely they are estimated to be underpriced when the coefficient of the railways dummy was significantly higher than zero. The total weeks of overpricing and underpricing for 
each year were then calculated. δ=Log of Dividend Yield, d=Log of Dividend, B=Beta, S=Size, R=Railway Dummy. 
 
For week = t 
                                           
(2) 
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Figure 1: Capital Gains Indices for Established Railways and Non-Railways, 
1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data for railway share prices from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railway share prices from 
Course of the Exchange (1843-50). Established railways index includes those railways which were operating before 
January 1843 for which share price and dividend data is available. Non-railways index includes the twenty largest 
non-railways by market capitalisation for which share price and dividend data is available. Capital gains for each 
company weighted by market capitalisation to produce market indices on a weekly basis. 
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Figure 2: Industry Dividend/Par Ratio Amongst Established Railways and 
Non-Railways, 1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data for both railway and non-railway dividends from Course of the Exchange (1843-50). Par value 
data for railways obtained from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railways from Course of the Exchange (1843-
50). Railway industry dividend/par ratio calculated as total dividends paid by established railway companies as a 
percentage of total par value of established railway companies for which share price and dividend data is available. 
Non-railway industry dividend/par ratio calculated as total dividends paid by non-railway companies as a percentage 
of total par value of non-railway companies for which share price and dividend data is available. 
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Figure 3: Industry Dividend Yield of Established Railways and Non-
Railways, 1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data for both railway and non-railway dividends from Course of the Exchange (1843-50). Share price 
data for railways obtained from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railways from Course of the Exchange (1843-
50). Railway industry dividend/price ratio calculated as total dividends paid by established railway companies as a 
percentage of total market capitalisation of established railway companies for which share price and dividend data is 
available. Non-railway industry dividend/price ratio calculated as total dividends paid by non-railway companies as a 
percentage of total market capitalisation of non-railway companies for which share price and dividend data is 
available. 
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Figure 4: Total Return Indices for Established Railways and Non-Railways, 
1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data for both railway and non-railway dividends from Course of the Exchange (1843-50). Share price 
data for railways obtained from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railways from Course of the Exchange (1843-
50). Half-yearly dividend assumed to be made in equal payments in each week. Total return, as measured by the sum 
of capital gains and dividends, for each company weighted by market capitalisation to produce market indices. 
Established railways index includes those railways which were operating before January 1843 for which share price 
and dividend data is available. Non-railways index includes the twenty largest non-railways by market capitalisation 
for which share price and dividend data is available. 
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Figure 5: Correlation between Log of Dividend Yield and  
Dividend Growth between t and t + 1 year, for Railway Companies, 1843-50 
 
 
 
 
Notes: n=188, Correlation coefficient = -0.654. Source data for dividends from Course of the 
Exchange (1843-58), with share price data for railways obtained from Railway Times (1843-50). 
One observation shown per company at end of December in each year between 1843 and 1850.  
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Figure 6: Impact of Railway Dummy on Log of Dividend Yield from Repeated Weekly Cross-sectional Regressions, 1843-50 
 
 
Panel A: Controlling for Beta and Size Panel B: Controlling for Two Years of Dividend 
Growth, Beta and Size 
  
 
 
 
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is calculated for each week of the sample. No dividend growth 
variable included. Value of the coefficient represents the value of    from Equation 2 in any given week, 
with a 95 per cent confidence interval constructed using robust standard errors. δ=Log of Dividend Yield, 
d=Log of Dividend, B=Beta, S=Size, R=Railway Dummy. 
 
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is calculated for each week of the sample. Dividend growth 
from variables from t to t+1, and from t+1 to t+2 included in regression. Value of the coefficient 
represents the value of    from Equation 2 in any given week, with a 95 per cent confidence interval 
constructed using robust standard errors. δ=Log of Dividend Yield, d=Log of Dividend, B=Beta, S=Size, 
R=Railway Dummy. 
For week = t 
                                           
(2) 
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